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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

C,\ROL E\VAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
10086

vs.
R.:\ ,. BUTIARS,

Defendant-Respondent.

PL:\INTIFF AND APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Ray VanCott, judge

REPL \" TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
The positions taken and arguments advanced in
Respondent's Brief require reply and some extension of
the citations of authority and correction of Respondent's
misunderstanding of the position of Appellant.
The t\\·o primary problems are dealt with separately
as follo,vs:
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I.
Presumption of due care arising from traumatic amnesia.
The rule that when an injured person is incapable,
by reason of the accident, to remember the circumstances
under 'vhich he was injured, he is entitled to the benefit
of the presumption of due care, is well settled and by no
means limited, as indicated in Respondent's argument,
to the presumption familiar in death cases.
So 'vell established is the rule that the new edition
of American Jurisprudence will contain, when the Negligence Volume is completed, the following addition to
the present Section 293, 38 Am. Jur 987 (Negligence)
which is now found as a note in the 1964 Supplemental
folder:
"Add following Note 10:
"The rule is \veil established that ,vhere the loss
of memory or other incapacity rendering the survivor of an accident incapable of testifying as to
the accident is sho,vn to be attributable to such
accident, it 'vill be presumed, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that he exercised due
care.''
It is true that no case precisely in point in Utah has
been yet decided. This case appears to be the first time
the matter has been squarely presented to this court. It
is therefore important here that the wisdom and widespread character of the decisions in our sister states should
be noticed and the rule be here declared in conformity
\Yith what is fast becoming universal. No case has been
noted in any jurisdiction where the validity of the rule
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has been denied. Without attempting to list here the
great number of decisions in point (many of \vhich \vill
be found compiled in ALR Blue Book of Supplemental
Decisions, Issue No. 10, 1964, p. 44·7 adding citations to
those compiled in the annotation in 141 ALR 873) the
follo'"ing list of cases will indicate somewhat jurisdictions
in which the rule is now \veil established (aside from
California where there is a great number of cases applying it) :
Prewitt v. Rutherford, 238 Iowa 1321, 30 N.W.

2d 141
Breaker v. Rosena, 301 Michigan 685, 4 N. W. 2d
57, 141 ALR 867 (Annotated in ALR)
[jttle Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 218 SW
2d 527, .~ffirmed 222 SW 2d 985, 148 Texas 107
Johnson v. Hetrick, 150 At. 477, 300 Pennsylvanie

225
Gregona v. Rushton, 101 A. 2d 768, 174 Pa. Super.

-ll7
Rutovitsky v. Magliocco, 147 At. 2d 153, 394 Pa.

387
Kreft v. Charles, 268 Wisconsin 44, 66 N. \A,T. 2d 618
Teeter v. MS&], 342 P. 2d 864 (New Mexico)

The clarity of the rule is indicated in the following
quotation from Gregona vs. Rushton, cited immediately
above. quoted and followed in Rutovitsky vs. M aggliocco,
above. In the Gregona case the plaintiff survived and testified that he couldn't remember the details. He woke up
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in a hospital 14 days after the accident. In the Rutovitsky
case the time involved was 6 hours:
"Furthermore, since pJflintiff testified that he remembered nothing from the time he stepped onto
the Chester Road on August 21, 1950, until he
regained consciousness in a hospital some 14 days
later, he was entitled to the presumption that he
did all the law required him to do and was not
contributorily negligent. (Heaps vs. So. Pac. Trac.
Co. 276 Pa. 551, 120 At. 548) Such presumption
is overcome so as to render the question of contributory negligence a matter of law only where
undisputed testimony and the inferences from it
point only to one conclusion."
There is no occasion for the alarm expressed by
Respondent about the application of the rule to this case.
When it is remembered that what is involved here is the
matter of denial of a jury trial, that the loss of memory
is clearly shown to be due to the injury (R. 73, 74) and
relates to crucial matters, every principle of justice and
reason supports invocation of the rule. In other words,
appellant is not asking this court to make any finding
beyond the point that a presumption exists giving rise to
questions on which the minds of reasonable men may
differ, and to the right to trial by jury.
At pages 14 and 15 of Respondent's Brief propositions are urged having to do with parties who have
"faulty recollections". Such cases are irrelevant to the
present issues, which are limited to traumatic amnesia
which may subside by the time of the trial (See the
opinion of Dr. Morro"v R. 74) or may not. Cases simply
involving failure to recall are not involved.
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II.
In italics at pages 10 and 11 of Respondent's Brief
is urged that "Nowhere in her Brief, however, does
Appellant point out those facts or evidence upon which
a jury could conclude that she was in the exercise of
due care."
In response to this charge, we respectfully point to
certain decisions of this honorable Court, and the facts
adverted to in the Appellant's Brief:
In Covington vs. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294
P ( 2) 788, this court said
"~lodem

traffic complexities make it impossible
to lay down by judicial rule what will always be,
or fail to be, reasonable care in the operation of
motor vehicles. The duty to keep a proper lookout
is manifest, but the obedience to or violation of
that duty must be determined according to particular circumstances and in accord with the
constantly varying exigencies occasioning each
accident. As to what constitutes a proper lookout
is usually, therefore, a latter-day classic question
for jury determination, and each trial and appellate court must determine the question as a
matter of law only when convinced that reasonable persons could not disagree upon the question
when conscientiously applying fact to law."
(Emphasis ours).
In Best vs. Huber, 3 Utah 2d 177, 281 P(2) 208 this
court repeated its pronouncement in Linden vs. Anchor
.\fin. Co., 20 Utah 134, 58 P. 355, 358:
"\Vhere there is uncertainty as to the existence of
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either negligence or contributory negligence the
question is not one of law but of fact, and to be
settled by a jury; and this whether the uncertainty
arises from a conflict in testimony or because, the
facts being undisputed, fair minded men will
honestly draw different conclusions from them."
With these rules in mind it is not difficult to find precedent in Utah decisions establishing the fact that honest
men may draw different conclusions from the facts in
this case.
It is not disputed that Appellant looked along the
street, saw cars, two of them, two blocks ( 660 feet long,
each, or one-quarter of a mile) away, moving toward
her at a speed of about 20 miles per hour (R. 32, lines
29-30). In the concurring opinion of Justice Wade of
this court, in Mingus vs. Olson 114 Utah 505, it is said:
In the same case, the Court said :
"If defendant was 133 feet away when they
stepped from the curb into the street and traveling
only 20 miles per hour, he \vould have ample time
to sound his horn and stop in time to avoid the
accident. Thus, under these circumstances, I think
it would be a jury case."
In the same case, the Court said:
"The duty to look has inherent in it the duty. t~
see what is there to be seen, and to pay heed to It.
The case of Coombs vs. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275
P 2d 680 is an even more impressive precedent. We note
these words:
"It is to be borne in mind that although the
motorist and pedestrian are both required to
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exercise the same standard of care, that of the
ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances,
that standard imposes upon the motorist a greater
amount of caution than upon the pedestrian, because of the potential danger to others in the
operation of an automobile."

***
·•It is deducible that at the time plaintiff looked
to the north the defendant *** at least was not
necessarily so close to plaintiff to be a threat to
hrr safety, and consequently that she did not step
from a place of safety to a place of danger as
defendant charges."
.~\t

pages 9 and 10 of Appellant's Brief there are
detailed the facts "·hich so clearly invoke the issues of
last clear chance in this case. The facts above noted, and
the rules expressed by this court make it eminently clear
that Respondent shoulrl have avoided hitting Appellant
if he had been obeying the lookout rule. She was within
a couple of steps of the edge of the road. He had a
\ride, clear road in \vhich to pass; Appellant was in
sudden, dire, inextricable peril of which Respondent had
reason to know in the exercise of due caution. Note the
expression of this Court in Beckstrom vs. Williams 282
P 2d 309, 3 Utah 2d 210:
".We are therefore concerned only \vith that portion of the rule which would permit a plaintiff
in extricable peril to recover from one who had
reasons to kno'v of the peril and to avoid in juring
him. Section 4 79 states the rule thus:
".\ plaintiff "·ho has negligently subjected himself
to a risk of harm from the defendant's subsequent
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negligence may recover for harm caused thereby
if immediately preceding the harm '(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care and (b) the defendant ***
would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and
thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless
peril had he exercised the vigilance which it was
his duty to plaintiff to exercise and (c) thereafter
is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable
care and competence his then existing ability to
avoid harming the plaintiff."
Commenting on this rule in AJarcellin vs. Osgul·
thorpe, 9 Utah 2d 1, 236 P 2d 779, this court said:
"Under such circumstances the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest and is not a concurring
proximate cause of the injury, but the negligence
of the defendant is the later, intervening, sole
proximate cause."
and ordered a ne\v trial.
It is not amiss to comment that in the Beckstrom
case this court noted the rule that on appeal it is the
duty of the court to consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff in determining whether or
not the case should have been submitted to the jury on
the doctrine of last clear chance.
The case of M arcellin vs. Osgulthorpe is illuminating on this matter of avoiding something in the road. In
that case there was a car projecting into the highway on
the right hand side, and another car parked on the left,
and applying the rule of evidence above stated, this court
said:
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"l"hcrc is no reason to assume that the defendant
had to apprehend that the plaintiff would not see
the Cadillac which was in plain sight on the high'"ay in front of him with the tail lights on, nor
that he \vould continue at a negligent rate of
speed, nor that he would fail to guide his car
safely bet,,·een the other two. There was actually
room to clear by several feet on either side."
In the present case there was ample room.
\Vith the foregoing explanatory and answering comments, it is respcctfulJy submitted that there exists in this
rase ample room for difference of opinion between reasonable men, and that the trial court erred prejudicially in
denying the right to jury trial.

Respectfully submitted,
BELL & BELL and C. BEN MARTIN
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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